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SOURCE OF FUNDS: THE
PREFERRED ALTERNATIVE
Hoffmann v. Hoffmann"
Among common law states that have adopted schemes for the equitable
distribution of property upon divorce, there are basically two systems. The first
system is commonly known as the "all property" system.2 Under this ap-
proach, the division of the divorced parties' property is based upon the concept
that marriage is a partnership.3 Therefore, upon divorce all property owned by
the married couple at the time of the divorce is subject to division. The court
takes into account various factors to determine the share of the property to
which each spouse is entitled.4
A second system used among equitable distribution states is called the
"dual property" systemY Again, under this system marriage and the dissolu-
tion of the marriage are treated as if they were a partnership. Under the dual
property system, however, not all property belonging to the couple at the time
of the divorce is necessarily subject to division. Only property which is deter-
mined to be marital will be divided between the spouses. Any other property
will be the separate property of one or the other spouse, and that spouse will
thereby receive that property upon divorce.6
This Note is applicable to dual property jurisdictions such as Missouri.7
This Note will look at the processes which have developed and are being used
among dual property states for determining whether property is marital and
thereby subject to division, or separate and thereby belonging solely to one
spouse.
1. 676 S.W.2d 817 (Mo. 1984) (en bane).
2. See generally, J. KRAUSKOPF, CASES ON PROPERTY DIVISION AT MARRIAGE
DISSOLUTION (1984).
3. Lacey v. Lacey, 45 Wis. 2d 378, 380, 173 N.W.2d 142, 144 (1970); see
also KRAUSKOPF, supra note 2, at 33.
4. Lacey, 45 Wis. 2d at 380. 173 N.W.2d at 146.
5. KRAUSKOPF, supra note 2, at 31-32.
6. Id.
7. Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.330 (Supp. 1983) provides in part:
1. In a proceeding for dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, or in a
proceeding for disposition of property following dissolution of the marriage by
a court which lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse or lacked
jurisdiction to dispose of the property, the court shall set apart to each
spouse his property and shall divide the marital property in such proportions
as the court deems just after considering all relevant factors. . ..
For a list of other jurisdictions with dual property systems see KRAUSKOPF, supra note
2, at 32.
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Hoffmann v. Hoffmann involved a question of whether corporate stock
held in the name of the husband at the time of the couple's divorce was the
property of the marital estate, or the separate property of the husband. In
dealing with this issue, the Missouri Supreme Court reformed the law of Mis-
souri. It held that for purposes of determining the status of property upon
dissolution of a marriage the "source of funds" rule is to be applied instead of
the "inception of title" rule.8 This Note will discuss both of these rules, and it
will explore the effects adoption of the source of funds rule may have on future
property distribution cases in Missouri.
Under Missouri's Dissolution of Marriage Act,9 all property acquired by
either spouse subsequent to the marriage is presumed to be marital property.10
All property acquired prior to the marriage by either spouse is that spouse's
separate property."' Thus, the critical issue is the determination of when prop-
erty was acquired.22 There are two basic theories which have developed over
the years for determining when property was "acquired." One is the inception
of title theory, and the other the source of funds theory.' 3 Prior to Hoffmann,
8. Hoffmann, 676 S.W.2d at 825.
9. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 452.300-452.420 (1978 & Supp. 1983).
10. Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.330.2 (Supp. 1983) provides in part:
2. For purposes of sections 452.300 to 452.415 only, "marital property"
means all property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage
except:
(1) Property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent;
(2) Property acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to the mar-
riage, or in exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or
descent;
(3) Property acquired by a spouse after a decree of legal separation;
(4) Property excluded by valid agreement of the parties; and
(5) The increase in value of property acquired prior to the marriage.
3. All property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage and
prior to a decree of legal separation is presumed to be marital property re-
gardless of whether title is held individually or by the spouses in some form of
co-ownership such as joint tenancy, tenancy in common, tenancy by the en-
tirety, and community property. Each spouse has a common ownership in
marital property which vests not later than the time of commencement by one
spouse against the other of an action in which a final decree is entered for
dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, the extent of the vested inter-
est to be determined and finalized by the court pursuant to this chapter. The
presumption of marital property is overcome by a showing that the property
was acquired by a method listed in subsection 2.
11. Property acquired after marriage may be separate if it falls within one of
the exceptions enumerated in the statute. See supra note 10; infra note 21 and accom-
panying text; see also MISSOURI PRACTICE, § 1065.25 (Supp. 1984).
12. Tibbetts v. Tibbetts, 406 A.2d 70, 74-75 (Me. 1979); Krauskopf, Marital
Property at Marriage Dissolution, 43 Mo. L. REV. 157, 180 (1978).
13. There also is a theory of law adopted by Illinois courts known as the "trans-
mutation" theory. This theory is not used for determining when property is acquired. It
is used, however, to cause property which was originally separate to become marital.
The court in Hoffmann rejected the Illinois theory of transmutation. 676 S.W.2d at
825. Note, however, that Missouri's appellate courts have for many years recognized
2
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Missouri courts applied the former theory. 14 Under inception of title, property
is fixed as either separate or marital at the moment title is acquired. 5 Thus, if
title is obtained by one spouse prior to the marriage, the property is the sepa-
rate property of that spouse, and remains as such after the marriage.' 6 If mar-
ital funds are used to pay any outstanding debt owed on the property, or in-
vested in its maintenance, the status is not affected. It remains separate,
although there may be a right to reimbursement to the marital estate for the
marital funds expended. 17 Any increase in the value of the property would
belong to the separate estate.' 8 The only way the property could change its
colors is by a clear showing that the parties intended the separate property be
contributed to the community. 19 Of course, on the other side of the coin, prop-
their own "transmutation" doctrine. See Jaeger v. Jaeger, 547 S.W.2d 207, 211 (Mo.
App., St. L. 1977); Conrad v. Bowers, 533 S.W.2d 614, 620 (Mo. App., St. L. 1975).
Whether the Hoffmann court intended to overrule these prior cases is not entirely clear.
There is an argument, however, that it did not, since the Illinois approach and Missouri
approach to transmutation of property appear to differ significantly.
In In re Marriage of Lee, 87 Ill. 2d 64, 430 N.E.2d 1030 (1981), the Illinois court
found that a capital contribution (improvement) of marital funds to non-marital prop-
erty (house) resulted in a rebuttable presumption that the entire property was trans-
muted to marital property. 87 IIl. 2d at 66, 430 N.E.2d at 1032. In Jaeger, the hus-
band sold his separate property and commingled the proceeds with marital funds. Then
he purchased new property with the commingled funds. The Missouri court found that
such a commingling indicated an intent of the husband to transmute the separate prop-
erty to marital property. Thus, the newly purchased asset was marital. 547 S.W.2d at
211.
It appears that under the Illinois approach, the separate property of one spouse
could be transmuted to marital property regardless of whether the owner of the sepa-
rate property subjectively intended such a result. It seems that this transmutation with-
out subjective intent is what Hoffmann has rejected, and not the doctrine as it was
applied in Jaeger.
14. E.g., Cain v. Cain, 536 S.W.2d 866 (Mo. App., Spr. 1976); Stark v. Stark,
539 S.W.2d 779 (Mo. App., K.C. 1976); see also, Note, Dissolution of Mar-
riage-Division of Property Which Has Increased in Value, 42 Mo. L. REV. 479
(1977).
15. Cain, 536 S.W.2d at 871; Stark, 539 S.W.2d at 782; 42 C.J.S. Husband
and Wife § 583 (1944); TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, § 439 at 241 (3d ed.
1939).
16. Jaeger, 547 S.W.2d at 211.
17. Tibbetts, 406 A.2d at 76 (dicta) (citing Cain, 536 S.W.2d at 866, and Gil-
lespie v. Gillespie, 84 N.M. 618, 506 P.2d 775 (1973), for the proposition that these
states allow the marital community to be reimbursed for the marital funds expended).
The marital community is said to have a lien on the separate property. Bartke, Yours,
Mine, and Ours-Separate Title and Community Funds, 44 WASH. L. REV. 379
(1969). But see Stark, 539 S.W.2d at 783 (entire farm which had increased in value
due to improvements made by marital funds awarded to husband; marital estate re-
ceived no reimbursement; court cited Cain, 536 S.W.2d at 866).
18. Davis v. Davis, 544 S.W.2d 259, 264 (Mo. App., K.C. 1976) (time payment
of a major part of the purchase price of the property, even though the payments oc-
curred after the marriage, did not alter the status of the property).
19. In re Marriage of Pate, 591 S.W.2d 384, 390 (Mo. App., W.D. 1979)
(court found that the husband did not intend to transfer ownership of his separate
[Vol. 50
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erty acquired subsequent to the marriage is presumed to be marital,20 unless it
falls within one of the exceptions in the statute.
2 1
The inception of title rule is very old.22 It was adopted in Missouri fairly
recently, in response to Missouri's Dissolution of Marriage Act.23 From its
birth in the state, the inception of title rule has borne the brunt of much criti-
cism.2 4 It has been suggested that the inception of title rule fails to promote
the partnership theory of marriage which is reflected in Missouri's Dissolution
Act. For example, a married couple would be reluctant to invest marital funds
in separate property, because the spouse who does not have a separate owner-
ship interest in the property will receive no benefit from any appreciation in its
value.2 5 In Hall v. Hall,26 the Maine Supreme Court noted that the inception
of title rule gives incentive for one spouse to divert marital funds for the en-
hancement of separate property, without giving any equitable interest to the
marital estate.2 7 Thus, it has been suggested that the inception of title rule
breeds marital discord. 28 The proffered alternative to the inception of title rule
has been the source of funds doctrine.2 9 The court in Hoffmann agreed with
these arguments, and decided that the source of funds rule is the more desira-
ble rule for determining when property is acquired. 0
The facts of Hoffmann v. Hoffmann are as follows. Sybil and Paul Hoff-
mann were married in 1963. Paul worked for Lillie-Hoffmann Cooling Tow-
property to his wife, thus the presumption that property acquired after marriage is
marital was rebutted); cf. Jaeger, 547 S.W.2d at 297 (husband sold separate property
and commingled the proceeds with marital funds, then purchased a new asset with the
funds; this was sufficient evidence for court to find an intent of the husband to trans-
mute his separate property to marital property); Marriage of Badalamenti, 566 S.W.2d
229 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978) (same); see also, supra note 13.
20. Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.330.3 (Supp. 1983).
21. Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.330 (Supp. 1983). For a case in which the presump-
tion was rebutted, see In re Marriage of Pate, 591 S.W.2d at 384.
22. For an excellent discussion of the origin and history of the inception of title
rule, see W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 64
(2d ed. 1971); Note, supra note 14.
23. Note, Marriage Dissolution: An Equitable Approach Toward Property
Distribution, 45 Mo. L. REV. 538 (1980). It was noted that the Dissolution of Mar-
riage Act adopts the community property approach to distributing property upon disso-
lution of marriage. Thus, Missouri courts also adopted the community property doc-
trine of "inception of title" to aid them in adapting to the Act. W. DEFUNIAK & M.
VAUGHN, supra note 22, at 130-34.
24. See generally Krauskopf, supra note 12; Note, supra note 14; Tiffany,
supra note 15, at 241.
25. Note, supra note 14, at 484.
26. 462 A.2d 1179 (Me. 1983).
27. Id. at 1182 (cited with approval in Hoffmann, 676 S.W.2d at 825).
28. Note, supra note 14, at 485.
29. Harper v. Harper, 294 Md. 54, 448 A.2d 916 (1982), aff'd on remand, 58
Md. App. 193, 472 A.2d 1018 (1984); Note, supra note 14, at 484 (source of funds
rule would be the better rule to apply for determining when property was acquired).
30. Hoffmann, 676 S.W.2d at 825.
1985]
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ers, Inc., a closely held corporation which had been founded by his father.3 1
Paul had worked for Lillie-Hoffmann since 1913, and had acquired 256 shares
of the corporation's stock by the time he and Sybil were wed; the stock repre-
sented 16 percent of the outstanding shares. In 1964, the corporation re-
deemed 858 shares of stock which were owned by Paul's father,32 causing
Paul's relative interest in the corporation to increase. 33 Between the years of
1964 and 1980 the corporation prospered, and by 1984, Paul's interest in the
corporation was worth $962,662.1"
In 1984, Sybil and Paul were divorced, and certain property was divided
by stipulation. The trial court, under statutory mandate,3 5 also made a deter-
mination and division of other marital property. In doing so, the court set
aside the shares of Lillie-Hoffmann stock as the husband's separate property.
The wife, Sybil, appealed this decision.3 6
Sybil proposed several theories under which the corporate shares should
have been characterized, at least in part, as marital property.3 7 One of the
31. Paul's father had bought out another founder's interest sometime after the
corporation was formed. Id. at 821.
32. "The corporation paid near book value price for the redemption of the fa-
ther's 858 shares. . . . The book value of the husband's stock remained the same after
the purchase of the father's stock by the corporation. The value of the corporation was
reduced by the amount of the purchase." Id. at 821 n.2.
Whether book value is of significance in valuation of Paul's stock is questionable.
It is possible that the husband realized actual economic gain as a result of the redemp-
tion of his father's stock. Id. at 821 (Blackmar, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (cites to H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAW OF CORPORATIONS 76 n.18 (3d ed.
1983), and accompanying text for a discussion of "book value" as an unreliable guide
to the actual value of corporate stock).
33. After his father's stock was retired, Paul had a 35% interest in the corpora-
tion, but by the time of this action, Paul had only 29.5% ownership of outstanding
shares. He had given 32 shares to his son and one share to a newly hired corporate
officer; his total number of shares was reduced to 223. Hoffmann, 676 S.W.2d at 821.
34. The value of Paul's stock at the time of the marriage is indeterminable from
the opinion. Sybil's expert witnesses had valued the shares at $2,723,000. The discrep-
ancy occurs because the husband's experts discounted the stock value because of the
lack of a public market for the stock, among other factors. Id. at 826.
The trial court apparently accepted the testimony of the husband's experts. Defer-
ence is given to the trial court's ability to judge the credibility of the witnesses and
weigh opinion evidence. Busby v. Busby, 669 S.W.2d 597, 599 (Mo. App., W.D. 1984);
City of Lake Lotowana v. Lehr, 529 S.W.2d 445, 452 (Mo. App., K.C. 1975). Thus,
unless the valuation is "clearly contrary to the facts or logical deductions from the
circumstances before the court," the trial court will not be held to have abused its
discretion. Beckman v. Beckman, 545 S.W.2d 300, 301 (Mo. App., K.C. 1976).
35. Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.330.1 (Supp. 1983) ("In a proceeding for. . . disso-
lution of marriage . . . the court shall set apart to each spouse his property and shall
divide the marital property . . ."); see also Corder v. Corder, 546 S.W.2d 798, 800
(Mo. App., K.C. 1977); Davis, 544 S.W.2d at 265.
36. Sybil raised several other issues on appeal, but for purposes of this Note
they are not significant.
37. The first two theories dealt with the increase in Paul's percentage interest in
the corporation as a result of the redemption of Paul's father's 858 shares. These two
[Vol. 50
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proposals made by Sybil was that a portion of the appreciation in the value of
the corporate shares was marital property. She asserted that the increase was
partially due to marital funds and efforts. 38 It was with regard to this argu-
ment that the source of funds rule received the court's consideration and
acceptance. 9
The court found the source of funds theory best suited to promote the
partnership theory of property distribution behind Missouri's Dissolution stat-
ute.40 The court recognized that a wife could share in the enhanced value of a
corporation's stock brought about by the husband's efforts. 41 To do so the wife
must establish the value of the husband's services to the corporation, or show
that he had sacrificed payment of marital funds, by way of salary or dividends,
in order to increase the value of the corporation's stock.42 If she could show
this, then the property would not be deemed to have been fully acquired until
subsequent to the marriage. The marital estate would receive an interest in the
property determined by the ratio of marital contributions to the total contribu-
tions.43 Sybil, however, did not meet this burden of proof. Because Paul had
been adequately compensated for his efforts by salary which was marital prop-
erty and which Sybil had shared, she failed to show that uncompensated mari-
tal efforts caused the appreciation in the value of the stock.4 4 Therefore, the
stock and the increased value were both Paul's separate property.45
Although it is clear that Missouri has not adopted the "equitable source
of funds" rule,46 it is not entirely clear what effect Hoffmann will have on all
arguments were disposed without mention of either the inception of title or source of
funds rule. Hoffmann, 676 S.W.2d at 822-23. It appears that the real issue involved
was the definition of "property" rather than "acquired" as is used in Mo. REv. STAT. §
451.330 (Supp. 1983). Source of funds is only concerned with when property is ac-
quired; therefore, these first two issues raised by Sybil are not relevant to this Note.
38. Hoffmann, 676 S.W.2d at 823.
39. Id. at 825.
40. Id. at 11-13 (citing In re Marriage of Moore, 28 Cal. 3d 366, 371-72, 618
P.2d 208, 210, 168 Cal. Rptr. 662, 664 (1980); Tibbetts, 406 A.2d at 76; Harper, 294
Md. at 65, 448 A.2d at 929).
41. Hoffmann, 676 S.W.2d at 825. The court cites no authority for this proposi-
tion. It is unclear how other jurisdictions would handle a similar situation. See infra
note 104 and accompanying text.
42. Id. at 826; accord Tibbetts, 406 A.2d at 77 (marital estate is entitled to a
proportionate return on its investment).
43. E.g., Smith v. Smith, 472 A.2d 943, 945 (Me. 1984); Moore at 373-74, 618
P.2d at 211, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 665.
44. Hoffmann, 676 S.W.2d at 826. Judge Blackmar, in his separate opinion,
was not satisfied that Sybil had a full opportunity to prove her case, because at the
trial, the trial court was applying the old rule. Judge Blackmar opined that the wife
should have been allowed to remand to the trial court to further develop her case under
the new law. Hoffmann, 676 S.W.2d at 829-30 (Blackmar, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
45. Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.330.2(5) (Supp. 1983) provides that the "increase in
value of property acquired prior to the marriage" is separate property.
46. Sybil did not receive any benefit from the rule because the court ultimately
1985]
6
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 4 [1985], Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss4/11
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
subsequent cases involving disputes over the status of property upon dissolu-
tion of marriage. The result reached by the Missouri Supreme Court was the
same as the lower courts, but the lower courts were applying the inception of
title rule and not source of funds. Because the Hoffmann court chose to apply
the new rule in a case in which it had no impact on the outcome, there is only
marginal guidance to practitioners. The rest of this casenote will look at the
source of funds rule, how it is applied in other jurisdictions, and how it may
develop in Missouri.
Under the source of funds rule acquisition is seen as a dynamic process.
4 7
The term "acquired" is defined "as the ongoing process of making payment
for property."'48 Thus, characterization of the property "depend[s] [upon] the
source of each contribution as it is made."'4 9 It should be noted that in some
situations, however, it is immaterial whether the source of funds rule or the
inception of title rule is being applied. The ultimate determination of whether
the property is separate or marital will be the same under either approach.
For example, if husband purchases a house and pays the entire purchase
price with his separate funds prior to that marriage, then the house is clearly
his separate property. The source of the entire contribution of the purchase
price was separate property and title was obtained prior to marriage. A subse-
quent marriage will not change any portion of the property to marital prop-
erty. 0 Likewise, if the house was purchased after the marriage, entirely with
marital funds, the house would belong to the community estate and it would
be subject to division as marital property upon dissolution of the marriage. 5'
found that the property was her husband's separate property. Hoffmann, 676 S.W.2d
at 825. Adoption of the source of funds rule was not necessary for the decision the
court reached. Thus the argument could be made that the court's adoption of the
source of funds rule is merely dicta.
Although announced in dicta, there is little doubt that the "source of funds" rule
is now the law in Missouri. The court in Hoffmann clearly overruled past cases which
followed the inception of title rule, listing as examples, Cain, 536 S.W.2d at 866,
Stark, 539 S.W.2d at 779, and Busby v. Busby, 669 S.W.2d 597 (Mo. App., W.D.
1984), See Hoffmann, 676 S.W.2d at 825. It seems unlikely that the court will subse-
quently withdraw from this new position.
47. Tibbetts, 406 A.2d at 77.
48. Grant v. Zich, 300 Md. 256, 261, 477 A.2d 1163, 1170 (1984); Harper, 294
Md. at 65, 448 A.2d at 929; see also Krauskopf, supra note 12, at 180.
49. Tibbetts, 406 A.2d at 77.
50. Id. at 76-77 n.9.
51. Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.330 (Supp. 1983). Note, the fact that property is
received subsequent to marriage does not alone establish it as marital. Under divorce
statutes similar to Missouri's, it merely raises a presumption of marital status. Com-
pare Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.330(3) (Supp. 1983) with ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §
722-A (Supp. 1979).
The presumption may be rebutted, for example, if the spouse purchasing the asset
can establish that the property was exchanged completely for that spouse's separate
property. Then the newly acquired asset is separate also. Smith v. Smith, 472 A.2d
943, 945 (Me. 1984). There are several other ways that property acquired after mar-
riage may be established as separate property. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.330.2(1)-(5)
[Vol. 50
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In either case the outcome would be the same regardless of whether source of
funds or inception of title were applied. In this regard, it has been noted that
the inception of title rule is the general rule of characterization, and the source
of funds rule is the equitable exception.5 2
Source of funds is needed to avoid unfairness that would occur in situa-
tions where property was not completely obtained by either separate funds or
marital funds.5 3 Under this equitable exception, property acquired with a mix-
ture of separate and marital property is given a dual characteristic, and is
treated as marital in part and separate in part. Each estate, marital and non-
marital, is entitled to an apportioned interest in the acquired property, deter-
mined by the ratio of community funds to separate funds.54
In adopting the source of funds rule in Missouri, the Hoffmann court re-
lied mainly on three jurisdictions that have previously employed the rule:
Maine, 55 California,5" and Maryland.57 Like those other courts, the Missouri
Supreme Court recognized that property distribution should be accomplished
in the most equitable manner, and decided that the source of funds rule best
served this goal. 58 The court found that the source of funds rule better imple-
mented Missouri's partnership theory of property distribution by deeming
property to be acquired as it is paid for,5" thereby allowing the marital estate
to share proportionately in any increased value in the property due to marital
funds and efforts.60
One of several fact patterns may occur which requires the use of the
source of funds rule. In the first fact pattern, property is purchased by the wife
prior to the marriage. At the time of purchase, that spouse pays only a portion
of the total price, and gives a mortgage for the rest.6' Marriage ensues, and
(Supp. 1983); see, e.g., Suter v. Suter, 97 Idaho 461, 546 P.2d 1169 (1976) (property
received as a gift was held to be the separate property of the donee-husband).
52. Tibbetts, 406 A.2d at 77 n.9.
53. Hoffmann, 676 S.W.2d at 825.
54. Tibbetts, 406 A.2d at 76; see also, In re Marriage of Jafeman, 29 Cal. App.
3d 244, 252, 105 Cal. Rptr. 483, 491 (1972); Forbes v. Forbes, 118 Cal. App. 2d 324,
257 P.2d 721 (1953); Gapsch v. Gapsch, 76 Idaho 44, 277 P.2d 278 (1954); Baize v.
Baize, 460 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
55. See, e.g., Tibbetts, 406 A.2d 70.
56. See, e.g., Moore, 28 Cal. 3d 366, 618 P.2d 208, 168 Cal. Rptr. 662.
57. See, e.g., Harper, 294 Md. 54, 448 A.2d 916.
58. Hoffmann, 676 S.W.2d at 825.
59. Id. (citing Harper, 294 Md. at 65, 448 A.2d at 929; Tibbetts, 406 A.2d at
77).
60. Id.
61. A situation that is analogous to the mortgage transaction is a credit
transaction:
Where property is acquired on credit, its characterization depends upon
the nature of the agreement extending the credit. Where the credit obligation
is not shown to be the separate and sole obligation of one spouse, then the
credit funds are presumed to be marital property and thus that portion of the
property acquired is marital property. The portion of the property acquired in
1985]
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the remainder of the obligation is paid off with marital funds .6 2
The facts of Cain v. Cain6 3 are almost identical to the above example. In
that case, however, the Missouri Supreme Court applied the inception of title
rule. As was noted earlier, under the inception of title rule, the property re-
mains unitary, and is deemed the wife's separate property, as it was in Cain."'
The best the marital estate could hope for would be a right to reimbursement
for marital funds expended. 65 Under the source of funds rule, however, a more
equitable approach is taken. Marriage is treated as a partnership,6 and consis-
tent with this analogy, dissolution is treated as if it were a partnership. The
wife, upon dissolution of the marriage, would receive as her separate estate an
interest in the property that reflects the ratio of the wife's separate contribu-
tion to the total contribution for the property. The marital estate would then
receive the remainder.6
To illustrate, suppose wife purchased the land at $100,000 prior to the
marriage, giving $10,000 down and signing a note for the remaining $90,000.
The following day, wife and husband marry. For the next ten years the two
live in wedded bliss, and continue to pay of the $90,000 note. In the eleventh
year, after the note has been paid off, the wife seeks a divorce from husband,
and it is granted. Subsequently the trial court is called upon to determine and
dispose of the property.6 8 Assume also that the property is now worth
$150,000.
According to the source of funds rule, wife would receive $15,000 as her
separate estate-10 percent of total equity of the property. The remaining
$135,000 would belong to the marital estate, and would be subject to divi-
exchange for marital credit and at the time of the divorce not yet fully paid
with either marital or non-marital funds is, therefore, marital property. This
is, of course, only significant where the property has so appreciated in value
that the value of the portion acquired on credit exceeds the amount of the
credit itself.
Tibbetts, 406 A.2d at 77; see also Carter v. Grabreel, 341 S.W.2d 458, 460 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1960); In re Daugherty's Estate, 27 Wash. 2d 11, 14, 176 P.2d 335, 339 (1947);
cf. Coates v. Coates, 64 Ill. App. 3d 914, 918, 381 N.E.2d 1200, 1204 (1978).
62. In all of the situations discussed, proof of the source from which the funds
comes is an essential element of the proponent's case. This may, in fact, prove to be the
fatal weak link in the proponent's chain. See Hoffmann, 676 S.W.2d at 826.
63. 536 S.W.2d 866 (Mo. App., Spr. 1976).
64. Id.
65. Krauskopf, supra note 12, at 180; see, Gillespie v. Gillespie, 84 N.M. 618,
506 P.2d 775 (1973).
66. Under the Uniform Marriage Act, marriage and the acquisition of marital
property are viewed as a partnership. Thus, this partnership theory is recognized in
pure inception of title jurisdictions also, but with a somewhat different perspective.
Corder, 546 S.W.2d 798. See Krauskopf, supra note 12, at 158; Krauskopf, A Theory
for "Just" Division of Marital Property in Missouri, 41 Mo. L. REV. 165 (1976).
67. Tibbetts, 406 A.2d at 77.
68. Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.330.1 (Supp. 1983) requires the court to set aside to
each his (her) separate property and divide the marital property.
[Vol. 50
9
Lemke: Lemke: Source of Funds:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
SOURCE OF FUNDS
sion.69 This is not to say, however, that the entire $135,000 will be divided
down the middle, with each spouse getting half. The marital property is di-
vided "in such proportions as the court deems just after considering all rele-
vant factors. °70
The preceding example quite obviously treated a simplified situation
where no outstanding obligation remained, and the entire equity of the prop-
erty belonged to the marital and non-marital estates. In such a case, all juris-
dictions which apply the source of funds rule would reach the same result.
Where the loan has not been fully paid at the time of the dissolution, the
formula used above may be inadequate. The court will be faced with the issue
of whether or not to give credit to the estate which obtained the loan for the
proceeds of the loan.
Hoffmann clearly does not answer this question, nor is it clear that the
answer is uniform throughout source of funds jurisdictions.71 The court in
Hoffmann does, however, cite to the California case of In re Marriage of
Moore72 with approval. In Moore, the court articulated a formula in which
credit was given to the estate which obtained the loan.73 It appears that the
California approach effectuates the more equitable distribution, which would
be in line with the purpose behind Hoffmann's adoption of the source of funds
rule.74 Thus, there is strong indication that such an approach will be followed
in Missouri.75
In In re Marriage of Moore,76 the California court was faced with the
69. E.g., Moore, 28 Cal. 3d at 366, 618 P.2d at 208, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 662;
Tibbetts, 406 A.2d at 70.
70. Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.330.1 (Supp. 1983). Included among the factors is
the contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the property, the value of each
spouse's separate property, economic circumstances, and the conduct of the parties dur-
ing the marriage. Id.
71. There are a few appellate level cases that provide a definitive answer, al-
though at least one court has given a specific formula for such a problem. See infra
notes 72-81 and accompanying text.
72. 28 Cal. 3d 366, 618 P.2d 208, 168 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1980).
73. Moore, 28 Cal. 3d at 373-74, 618 P.2d at 211, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 665 (citing
In re Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979) (court
gave marital community credit for the loan because the loan was taken out against
marital assets)).
74. Hoffmann, 676 S.W.2d at 825. "By adopting this definition of 'acquired
and the source of funds theory, our statutes and their purpose of promoting the part-
nership theory of marriage will be consistent in providing for the most equitable distri-
bution of property."
75. See Brooks v. Kunz, 637 S.W.2d 135 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982). The Court of
Appeals for the Eastern District was faced with a question of partitioning property held
by non-marital co-tenants. One of the co-tenants had paid the entire cash down pay-
ment, but both had jointly executed a note for part of the purchase price. The court
found that credit should be allowed to each co-tenant for one-half the mortgage
amount financed subject to contribution if one co-tenant pays more than his share. Id.
at 139-40.
76. 28 Cal. 3d 366, 618 P.2d 208, 168 Cal. Rptr. 662.
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following situation. Prior to the marriage, Lydie purchased a house at a price
of $56,000.77 Lydie made a down payment of $16,000 and secured a loan for
$40,000.78 Eventually she and David married, making payments on the home
with community funds in the amount of about $5,000. The parties subse-
quently divorced. The total paid on the purchase price was $21,000 and the
balance owed was $35,000. The market value of the house at the time of disso-
lution was $160,000, and the equity therein was $125,000.
The court decided that in calculating the pro-rata shares of the separate
and marital estates, the economic value of the loan taken out by Lydie should
be taken into account.79 The value of the loan is accounted for because the
loan contribution by Lydie was a separate property contribution. It is based on
separate assets, it is a separate obligation, and will be paid off in the future
out of Lydie's separate funds. Therefore, the separate property percentage in-
terest should be calculated by adding the down payment to the full amount of
the loan, less the amount by which the community funds have reduced the
principal, 80 and then by dividing that figure by the purchase price.
In Moore, the calculations would have been as follows: (1) Add the
$16,000 down payment to $35,000 (the difference between the $40,000 loan
payment and the $5,000 paid on the principal with marital funds). The total
separate contribution is $51,000. (2) Divide the $51,000 by the total purchase
price of $56,000. Thus Lydie's separate percentage interest is 91 percent. (3)
Determine the separate property interest in the capital appreciation that is
attributable to the separate funds. Multiply the 91 percent by the $104,000
capital appreciation to get $94,640. The $104,000 is calculated by subtracting
the total amount of money paid on the principal from the equity: $125,000 -
21,000 = $104,000. (4) Add the $94,000 to the $16,000 separate contribution
actually made by Lydie toward the equity. The result is that Lydie's separate
property interest is $110,640. By applying this formula, complex as it is, the
role of the loan on the value of the property is accounted for.81 If the loan had
occurred after the marriage, then the loan proceeds would be treated as a
community property contribution, the same principles would apply, and the
marital community would receive the credit for the amount of the loan.82
77. All of the numbers have been rounded off to make the case more
illustrative.
78. Title was in her name alone. 28 Cal. 3d at 370, 618 P.2d at 209, 168 Cal.
Rptr. at 663.
79. Id. at 373-74, 618 P.2d at 211, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 665. It is not entirely clear
all "source of funds" jurisdictions follow this approach, although there are no cases to
the contrary.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 374, 618 P.2d at 212, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
82. The following is an example of how the calculations would look if the com-
munity estate was to get credit for the loan proceeds. Assume that a house is purchased
for $100,000. The wife puts down the entire down payment of $20,000 with her sepa-
rate funds, and the rest of the purchase price is made with an $80,000 loan that is a
community obligation. Also assume that at the time of dissolution, the house is worth
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A second fact pattern may also arise wherein the source of funds doctrine
will have a significant impact. This case involves a situation where property is
purchased by wife prior to the marriage. The entire purchase price is paid and
title is in her name free and clear. Wife then marries husband, and the two
make improvements on the property with community funds.8 3 The Maine case
of Hall v. Hall 4 involved a similar situation. Husband and wife married and
lived in what was undisputably the separate house of the husband. In the
course of the marriage, renovation and improvements were made on the house,
increasing the value of the property. Upon divorce, the court was faced with
deciding the extent to which the separate property was converted to marital
property.85
After considering several alternatives, including the inception of title
rule,86 the Maine Supreme Court applied the source of funds rule. It decided
that the marital estate acquired an interest in the property to the extent that
marital funds enhanced the value of the property; thus the marital estate was
entitled to more than just the cost of improvements8 7 The opinion stated that
courts should treat the expenditures as an equity investment of community
funds, thereby allowing the community to share in the market fluctuations.
Any other result would be grossly unfair. 8  The court applied the ratio of "sep-
arate investment to total investment" to determine the respective interests of
the marital and separate estates in the property.8 9
Quite obviously, the adoption of this new rule will cause dramatic changes
and differing results from past cases with regard to property distribution. Cir-
cumstances which heretofore would have given one spouse a distinct advantage
$175,000, with an outstanding mortgage of $75,000; therefore the equity therein is
$100,000.
The community estate would be determined by first calculating the community
property percentage interest. On these facts it would be 80% ($80,000 community con-
tribution divided by the $100,000 purchase price). Next, to determine the dollar value
of the community's interest, the 80% is multiplied by $75,000 ($100,000 equity less the
amount of principal already paid; the amount of principal already paid must be sub-
tracted from the equity because the community is only being credited here with the
amount of capital appreciation attributable to the community funds) which equals
$60,000. The amount of equity paid by community funds ($80,000 minus $75,000) is
added to the $60,000, and the result is $65,000 as the net value of the community
property interest. See In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 816-17 n.3, 614 P.2d
285, 290 n.3, 166 Cal. Rptr. 662, 667 n.3 (1980); Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152
Cal. Rptr. 668.
83. E.g., Stark v. Stark, 539 S.W.2d 779 (Mo. App., K.C. 1976) (inception of
title was applied and the entire house including the improvements remained the hus-
band's separate property).
84. 462 A.2d 1179 (Me. 1983).
85. Id. at 1180.
86. Id. at 1181 (citing Stark, 539 S.W.2d 779).
87. Id. at 1182.
88. Id. at 1182 (citing Portillo v. Shappie, 97 N.M. 59, 64, 636 P.2d 878, 883
(1981), which in turn quoted Bartke, supra, note 18, at 161).
89. Hall, 462 A.2d at 1182; Tibbetts, 406 A.2d at 75.
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in the distribution phase of the divorce, will now allow the marital estate to
share more equitably in the total estate. Although there are obvious changes
that will occur, there are still many unanswered questions regarding applica-
tion of the source of funds rule in Missouri. The answers, of course, depend to
some extent on the facts involved in each case. They also, however, depend
upon which jurisdictions the Missouri courts may look to for guidance in the
future.
Because of the court's obvious reliance in Hoffmann on the California,
Maine, and Maryland decisions, it is logical to assume that in future cases the
Missouri courts will continue to look to these other jurisdictions for guidance;
at least until the Missouri courts develop their own body of case law. There
are situations, however, where it is not entirely clear that Missouri courts will
follow the lead of these other states. Suppose husband purchases a house prior
to marriage. Then he marries wife, and the two subsequently purchase a mari-
tal home, using proceeds from the sale of the first home to pay most of the
purchase price on the second. However, at least part of the funds used to pay
for the second house are the wife's separate property, and subsequent mort-
gage payments are made with marital funds. Title is in both husband's and
wife's names. Then the parties sell the second home and purchase a third,
using proceeds from the sale of the second home and paying on the mortgage
with marital funds, also putting title in both names.90
In Grant v. Zich, the Maryland court applied the source of funds doc-
trine, without considering that title was in both husband and wife's name.91
The court determined that a presumption of gift arising from the titling of
property by tenancy by the entirety was not consistent with Maryland's dis-
pository scheme. The court declared that a gift of separate property to the
marital estate is to be established, the spouse claiming the gift must prove that
a gift was made.92 In absence of such proof, the house will be characterized as
part non-marital and part marital. Of course, the spouse claiming the asset to
be partially his separate property must be able to trace the separate funds
originally expended through to the final asset acquired.9 3 Assuming this trac-
ing is accomplished, the interest of the marital estate would then be deter-
mined by the ratio that the non-marital investment bears to the total
investment.94
Whether Missouri courts will reach the same result as that reached in
Grant, if presented with similar facts, is questionable. There is authority in
Jaeger v. Jaeger 5 that they will not. In Jaeger, the husband sold certain
stocks and bonds that he had owned prior to the marriage. At the same time,
90. See Grant v. Zich, 300 Md. 256, 477 A.2d 1163.
91. Id. at 276, 477 A.2d at 1173.
92. Id.
93. Id. In this case, the husband was able to show the separate funds as they
passed from one residence to the other.
94. Id. at n.9.
95. 547 S.W.2d 207 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977).
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he also sold stocks belonging to the marital estate. Following the sales, the
husband commingled the proceeds and purchased entirely new stocks and
bonds with the commingled funds. The court found that the proper result
under Missouri's Dissolution Act would be to treat the newly acquired assets
as marital, regardless of whether the new asset was titled in both or only one
spouse's name.9 6 Because the husband had commingled separate funds with
marital funds and purchased new assets therewith, he had intended to trans-
mute his separate property into marital property; therefore, the newly ac-
quired asset was wholly marital.""
Applying these same principles to facts similar to those in Grant, there is
strong argument that the newly purchased house is marital, and not non-mari-
tal to any extent. Where the husband sells a house he owned prior to marriage,
and purchases a new one subsequent to marriage, with both his separate and
marital funds, there is just as strong an indication that he intended the new
house to be entirely marital, as there was that the husband in Jaeger intended
the new stocks to be entirely marital. Assuming Jaeger controls, there would
be no opportunity for the husband to trace his separate property into the new
asset and establish the property as separate in part. This result would clearly
be contrary to Grant.9
Exactly how Missouri courts will decide this type of case is not a foregone
conclusion, but it is reasonable to say that Jaeger will control since it can be
applied consistently with the purposes behind the source of funds doctrine and
Missouri's dissolution statute. Attorneys, therefore, will still have to advise cli-
ents of the likely consequences of combining marital and separate assets to
purchase property subsequent to the marriage.
There is one final situation worth nothing in which the source of funds
rule may play a significant role, and in which it is not clear how Missouri
courts will decide. In this situation, the asset under dispute is the interest that
the married couple has in a corporation, a circumstance analogous to Hoff-
mann. Missouri courts have clearly had no problem finding that shares in a
corporation are subject to division as marital property upon dissolution of mar-
riage.99 This is true at least where the stock was purchased with marital funds
subsequent to marriage.100 In Hoffmann, the court also implied that the mari-
tal estate could share in corporate shares, even if title was established in one
96. Id. at 211. The court notes that under Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.330.3 (Supp.
1983), property acquired subsequent to marriage is presumed marital. Further, the
court states that the "exchange" exception to this presumption found in § 452.330.2(2)
is inapplicable in a case where a person uses both marital and non-marital property to
purchase new property during the marriage. By commingling the property, the separate
property loses its separate identity. Id. at 211. See supra note 10 for a list of the
presumptions and the exceptions.
97. 547 S.W.2d at 211; see also supra note 13.
98. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
99. E.g., Conrad v. Bowers, 533 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. App., St. L. 1975).
100. E.g., Jaeger, 547 S.W.2d at 211 (citing Conrad, 533 S.W.2d 614; In re
Marriage of Powers, 527 S.W.2d 949 (Mo. App., St. L. 1975)).
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spouse prior to the marriage. It appears that the marital estate must show that
marital funds and efforts were expended which caused, at least in part, the
increase in value of the stock. 1
The Missouri case of Davis v. Davis10 2 involved a husband who owned a
corporation prior to the marriage and continued to do so during the marriage.
He was also president of the corporation, kept the books, and did several other
tasks connected with running the business. The husband's salary at the time of
trial was $6,500 a year. The corporation was purchased for $84,000 in 1976.
At the time of the divorce it was valued at approiimately $152,000. Much of
the increased value was due to the husband's efforts during the marriage.103
Furthermore, the wife introduced evidence that she had become a director and
vice-president of the corporation, and had signed notes secured by deeds of
trust, the proceeds of which were used for the corporation. Thus, it may also
be said that the wife's efforts during the marriage contributed to the increase
in value of the corporation.
The court in Davis applied the inception of title rule. It ruled that regard-
less of the wife's efforts, the obligation she incurred for the corporation, or the
fact that a major part of the corporate assets were purchased after the mar-
riage, the corporation remained the separate property of the husband. 10 4
If the source of funds rule was applied, a different result would occur.
One way to reach the increased value of the corporation under the source of
funds rule would be for the wife to show that the husband was not adequately
compensated for his services to the corporation.105 If she could show this, the
court might determine that marital funds and efforts were sacrificed for the
increased value. Therefore, the marital estate would have an interest in the
stock to the extent of the salary that the husband should have received."0 '
Furthermore, in Davis, the wife also contributed to the corporation by way of
industry and by incurring obligations for the corporation's benefit. Under these
circumstances, she could assert that she too was not fairly compensated for her
services, thereby sacrificing marital assets which inured to the corporation's
benefit. Thus, a strong argument could be made that the marital estate should
receive an interest in the corporation to the extent of marital assets
sacrificed.107
In theory, the above argument is plausible, but in practice it may be diffi-
cult to prove. The burden of proving that the compensation was inadequate is
101. Hoffmann, 676 S.W.2d at 826.
102. 544 S.W.2d 259 (Mo. App., K.C. 1976).
103. Krauskopf, supra note 12, at 188.
104. Davis, 544 S.W.2d at 264.
105. The Hoffmann court recognized that this would be a perfectly legitimate
theory to pursue. 676 S.W.2d at 825.
106. Id. at 15; see also King, The Challenge of Apportionment, 37 WASH. L.
REV. 483, 487 (1962).
107. Hoffmann, 676 S.W.2d at 825-26.
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difficult to meet. 10 8 In most instances, in fact, the courts have declined to re-
verse findings that the increase in value of the corporation was separate
property.:0 9
Another argument is available that would allow the marital estate to
reach the increased value of stock that was owned by one of the spouses prior
to marriage. In Norris v. Vaughan,'" a Texas court found that the husband
owned a one-fourth interest in a partnership. During the marriage he secured
for the partnership the right to drill several oil wells. It was held that the one-
fourth interest he had in the new wells was community property. The court
treated the increased value of the partnership as a new asset acquired subse-
quent to marriage, rather than an increase in value in the husband's separate
asset."" This same theory could be applied to the increased value of corporate
stock where the husband's efforts during the marriage led to the increase. It
could be said that the increased value of the stock is new property acquired
subsequent to marriage, and, therefore, marital property under the dissolution
statute."'
Whether the source of funds rule is superior to the inception of title rule
in all aspects of property distribution is probably open to debate."' Judge
Welliver, in his separate opinion in Hoffmann, opined that "adoption of the
source of funds test [will] only serve to saddle an already overburdened judici-
ary with a tedious task of tracing that will generally be as undeterminative of
the case as the discussion was [in Hoffmann].""" While it might be true that
in some cases the tracing of property through the marriage will be difficult and
may be futile, this should not discourage application of the rule altogether.
The Missouri Marriage and Dissolution Act was adopted to promote the part-
nership theory of marriage." 5 The source of funds rule is better suited to carry
out this objective." 0 By applying the source of funds rule, a non-owning
108. In Hoffmann, it was Sybil's inability to show that Paul had not been ade-
quately compensated that led the court to find the increased value of the stock to be
Paul's separate property. 676 S.W.2d at 826.
109. Krauskopf, supra note 12, at 188 (citing Kenney v. Kenney, 128 Cal. App.
2d 128, 274 P.2d 951 (1954); Van Camp v. Van Camp. 53 Cal. App. 17, 199 P. 885
(1921); Mifflin v. Mifflin, 97 Idaho 895, 556 P.2d 854 (1976); Michelson v. Michelson,
89 N.M. 282, 551 P.2d 638 (1976)).
110. 152 Tex. 491, 260 S.W.2d 676 (1953).
111. Id. at 497-98, 260 S.W.2d at 680.
112. Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.330.3 (Supp. 1983). Note that if this theory were
applied, it would not matter whether the source of funds rule or inception of title rule
were applied. The "new asset" would be considered to have been acquired subsequent
to the marriage and without regard to either rule, the Missouri Dissolution Act deter-
mines that the asset is marital. Id.
113. This debate is evidenced by the fact that so many jurisdictions still remain
as inception of title states. Even the court in Hoffmann did not all agree that it was a
wise choice. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
114. Hoffmann, 676 S.W.2d at 829 (Welliver, J., concurring in result).
115. Id. at 825.
116. Krauskopf, supra note 12 at 180.
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spouse is able to realize a return on his investment in the marital partnership.
Where improvements or payments of debts are made on separate property
with marital funds the marital community is "entitled to share in the propor-
tionate increase in value of the property attributable to [the marital funds and
efforts expended] .117 The source of funds rule allows the marital estate to
share in the appreciation in the value of the property,118 rather than just al-
lowing it to be reimbursed for its efforts. Clearly this approach is the most
equitable approach to property distribution.119
Adoption of the rule may have more effect than just fairly dividing prop-
erty. It will influence advice that attorneys will give to their clients. The attor-
ney will have to counsel his client that property she owned, prior to the mar-
riage, may lose its status as separate property upon the happening of certain
events such as payment of part of the purchase price after marriage, or im-
provements made on the property after marriage with marital funds. Of
course, the attorney may also advise his client that she can invest in the en-
hancement of her spouse's separate property with the knowledge that she is
investing in the marital community. This may be the best reason for adopting
the source of funds rule. Knowledge by both spouses that the marital commu-
nity will be treated as a partnership, and will be treated equitably upon possi-
ble dissolution may lead to marital harmony. 20 Both spouses will feel free to
make their investment in the marriage knowing that they are making an in-
vestment in something that they will share in regardless of future events.
DAVID E. LEMKE
117. Hoffmann, 676 S.W.2d at 825 (citing Tibbetts, 406 A.2d at 76-77).
118. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
119. Hoffmann, 676 S.W.2d at 825.
120. Note, supra note 14, at 480.
[Vol. 50
17
Lemke: Lemke: Source of Funds:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
